Summarising the argument so far, the conclusion is that the right to self-identify and thus to put all gender identities on the same footing only makes sense if "woman" and "man" are gender- and not sex- terms.
> If there is such a right then anyone who insists that “man” and “woman”, “girl” and “boy” etc. are not self-ascribable states of gender is a transphobe.
I would highlight a further consideration here, since you have raised the comparison to religious belief: It is also possible for someone to disagree with self-ascribed states *while nonetheless agreeing that others have the right to ascribe them*.
Just as it is possible for an atheist to agree that others have a right to be Christian, likewise someone might say, "I don't consider subjective gender identity to have primacy over biology, so I don't consider you to be male - but I accept that you have every right to think of yourself as male, and to try to persuade other people that you are male, if you so choose."
An interesting thought and it raises an important issue. I think the analogy breaks down at this point (I think I say something that touches on this point in another piece in relation to Bettcher’s “trans philosophy”). So for example, it’s up to Christians to decide who is and is not a “real” Christian (and Taylor Swift fans who is and is not a “real” Swiftie). So their authenticity claims are related to the relevant “community”. But disputing the relevance of biology to classification by sex (so who is a “real” woman) and what follows from that is a contestable public claim that affects far more people than the “trans community”. And so I don’t think that there’s an associated right to “believe” here that should be respected as such. After all, it’s not a case of getting to convince someone that you’re really female (say) in the sense of convince that worlds involve a blood test or something. It’s a matter of suggesting that the word “female” is used to mean something completely different, the correct use of which answers to no norm outside the domain of the subject’s self-identification.
> So for example, it’s up to Christians to decide who is and is not a “real” Christian (and Taylor Swift fans who is and is not a “real” Swiftie).
Mm, yes and no. A specific church organization could certainly dictate rules for membership, but for religious belief in the general sense, I'm pretty sure it's not adjudicated by the community. If someone claims to be Christian, I'm pretty sure courts aren't in the business of calling in other Christians to judge whether or not they qualify.
> It’s a matter of suggesting that the word “female” is used to mean something completely different, the correct use of which answers to no norm outside the domain of the subject’s self-identification.
Yes, I'm just saying it's possible for someone to hold the position that they don't think it does mean something completely different, but that they will allow others to think so. The Voltaire approach, "I disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it.'
I actually don't see religious comparisons as a mere analogy; in my view, the modern notion of gender identity - a deeply felt, yet unmeasurable and thus unfalsifiable belief about the non-physical nature of a human being - *is* an essentially religious belief. And deserves all the protections and limitations that attach to religious belief and expression.
Hi. I didn't suggest that courts are there to adjudicate! I mean that the "content" of such beliefs is regulated by community norms of some sort, hence the parallel with Swifties. I don't think the religious comparison holds fully as I'm not confident about distinguishing "religious belief in the general sense" from (other) varieties of strong cultural affiliation. I suppose Scientology and Mormonism are both considered religions in this "general" sense these days, but perhaps gender absolutism (GA) is more of a cult at this stage. On the Voltaire point, that is about free speech whereas you initially seemed to be talking about freedom of conscience (the right to believe?). So I absolutely believe that someone has the "right" to say "I am a woman" just as someone has the right to say "I am a Christian" or "I am a Mormon". But whereas in the latter cases I for example don't care much unless I'm likely to be trapped in an embarrassing conversation, in the "woman" case claims are being made to truth that have much more of an impact on the lives of others. That returns us to the utility of the comparison with religion, and your thought about "protections and limitations". As you know, how this "balance" is struck is long story with different strands and no end in sight. But given the rapidity with which GA has spread in the West then if you want to push the religious parallel it seems to be more of the order of a "state" religion, like Islam in Afghanistan. And in that sense it's "secular" culture that needs "protections"!
> If there is such a right then anyone who insists that “man” and “woman”, “girl” and “boy” etc. are not self-ascribable states of gender is a transphobe.
I would highlight a further consideration here, since you have raised the comparison to religious belief: It is also possible for someone to disagree with self-ascribed states *while nonetheless agreeing that others have the right to ascribe them*.
Just as it is possible for an atheist to agree that others have a right to be Christian, likewise someone might say, "I don't consider subjective gender identity to have primacy over biology, so I don't consider you to be male - but I accept that you have every right to think of yourself as male, and to try to persuade other people that you are male, if you so choose."
Should such a position be called "transphobic"?
An interesting thought and it raises an important issue. I think the analogy breaks down at this point (I think I say something that touches on this point in another piece in relation to Bettcher’s “trans philosophy”). So for example, it’s up to Christians to decide who is and is not a “real” Christian (and Taylor Swift fans who is and is not a “real” Swiftie). So their authenticity claims are related to the relevant “community”. But disputing the relevance of biology to classification by sex (so who is a “real” woman) and what follows from that is a contestable public claim that affects far more people than the “trans community”. And so I don’t think that there’s an associated right to “believe” here that should be respected as such. After all, it’s not a case of getting to convince someone that you’re really female (say) in the sense of convince that worlds involve a blood test or something. It’s a matter of suggesting that the word “female” is used to mean something completely different, the correct use of which answers to no norm outside the domain of the subject’s self-identification.
> So for example, it’s up to Christians to decide who is and is not a “real” Christian (and Taylor Swift fans who is and is not a “real” Swiftie).
Mm, yes and no. A specific church organization could certainly dictate rules for membership, but for religious belief in the general sense, I'm pretty sure it's not adjudicated by the community. If someone claims to be Christian, I'm pretty sure courts aren't in the business of calling in other Christians to judge whether or not they qualify.
> It’s a matter of suggesting that the word “female” is used to mean something completely different, the correct use of which answers to no norm outside the domain of the subject’s self-identification.
Yes, I'm just saying it's possible for someone to hold the position that they don't think it does mean something completely different, but that they will allow others to think so. The Voltaire approach, "I disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it.'
I actually don't see religious comparisons as a mere analogy; in my view, the modern notion of gender identity - a deeply felt, yet unmeasurable and thus unfalsifiable belief about the non-physical nature of a human being - *is* an essentially religious belief. And deserves all the protections and limitations that attach to religious belief and expression.
Hi. I didn't suggest that courts are there to adjudicate! I mean that the "content" of such beliefs is regulated by community norms of some sort, hence the parallel with Swifties. I don't think the religious comparison holds fully as I'm not confident about distinguishing "religious belief in the general sense" from (other) varieties of strong cultural affiliation. I suppose Scientology and Mormonism are both considered religions in this "general" sense these days, but perhaps gender absolutism (GA) is more of a cult at this stage. On the Voltaire point, that is about free speech whereas you initially seemed to be talking about freedom of conscience (the right to believe?). So I absolutely believe that someone has the "right" to say "I am a woman" just as someone has the right to say "I am a Christian" or "I am a Mormon". But whereas in the latter cases I for example don't care much unless I'm likely to be trapped in an embarrassing conversation, in the "woman" case claims are being made to truth that have much more of an impact on the lives of others. That returns us to the utility of the comparison with religion, and your thought about "protections and limitations". As you know, how this "balance" is struck is long story with different strands and no end in sight. But given the rapidity with which GA has spread in the West then if you want to push the religious parallel it seems to be more of the order of a "state" religion, like Islam in Afghanistan. And in that sense it's "secular" culture that needs "protections"!